Abstract. Malware for current smartphone platforms is becoming increasingly sophisticated. The presence of advanced networking and sensing functions in the device is giving rise to a new generation of targeted malware characterized by a more situational awareness, in which decisions are made on the basis of factors such as the device location, the user profile, or the presence of other apps. This complicates behavioral detection, as the analyst must reproduce very specific activation conditions in order to trigger malicious payloads. In this paper, we propose a system that addresses this problem by relying on stochastic models of usage and context events derived from real user traces. By incorporating the behavioral particularities of a given user, our scheme provides a solution for detecting malware targeting such a specific user. Our results show that the properties of these models follow a power-law distribution: a fact that facilitates an efficient generation of automatic testing patterns tailored for individual users, when done in conjunction with a cloud infrastructure supporting device cloning and parallel testing. We report empirical results with various representative case studies, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach to detect complex activation patterns.
Introduction
Malware for smartphones is a problem that has rocketed in the last few years [1] . The presence of increasingly powerful computing, networking, and sensing functions in smartphones has empowered malicious apps with a variety of advanced capabilities [2] , including the possibility to determine the physical location of the smartphone, spy on the user's behavioral patterns, or compromise the data and services accessed through the device. These capabilities are rapidly giving rise to a new generation of targeted malware that makes decisions on the basis of factors such as the device location, the user's profile, or the presence of other apps (e.g., see [3] [4] [5] [6] ).
The idea of behaving differently under certain circumstances was also successfully applied in the past. For instance, Stuxnet [7] remained dormant until a particular app was installed and used at certain location, having as a target Iranian nuclear plants. Other malware has targeted governments and private corporations-mostly in the financial and pharmaceutical sectors [8] . Another representative example of targeted malware is Eurograbber [9], a "smart" Trojan targeting online banking users. The situational awareness provided by smartphone platforms makes this type of attacks substantially easier and potentially more dangerous. More recently, other examples of targeted malware include FinSpy Mobile [10], a general surveillance software for mobile devices, and Dendroid Remote Access Toolkit (RAT) [11] , which offers capabilities to target specific users.
A similar problem is the emergence of the so-called grayware [3], i.e., apps that cannot be completely considered malicious but whose behavior may entail security and/or privacy risks of which the user is not fully aware. For example, many apps using targeted advertisements are particularly aggressive in the amount of personal data they gather, including sensitive contextual information acquired through the device sensors. The purpose of such data gathering activities is in many cases questionable, and many users might well disapprove of it, either entirely or in certain contexts 1 . Both targeted malware and grayware share a common feature that complicates their identification: the behavior and the potential repercussions of executing an app might depend quite strongly on the context where it takes place [12] and the way the user interacts with the app and the device [13] . We stress that this problem is not addressed by current detection mechanisms implemented in app markets, as operators are overwhelmed by the number of apps submitted for revision every day and cannot afford an exhaustive analysis over each one of them [14] . A possible solution to tackle this problem could be to implement detection techniques based on dynamic analysis (e.g., Taintdroid [15] ) directly in the device. However, this is simply too demanding for battery-powered platforms. Several recent works [16] [17] [18] [19] have proposed to keep a synchronized replica (clone) of the device virtualized in the cloud. This would facilitate offloading resourceintensive security analysis to the cloud, but still does not solve one fundamental problem: grayware and targeted malware instances must be provided with the user's particular context and behavior, so the only option left would be to install the app, use it, and expect that the analysis conducted over the clone-hopefully in real time-detects undesirable behaviors. This is a serious limitation that prevents users from learning in advance what an app would do in certain situations, without the need of actually reproducing such a situation.
Related Work. Recent works such as PyTrigger [20] have approached the problem of detecting targeted malware in Personal Computers (PC). To do so, it
